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Abstract
Trust in the citizens of a potential partner country may aﬀect the decision
to trade with or to migrate to a foreign country. This paper employs panel data
to examine the causal impact of such bilateral trust on international trade and
migration patterns. We apply instrumental variables (IV) approaches that cap-
ture the exogenous variance of bilateral trust separately with eight indicators
of genetic (“somatic") distance between country-pairs. These indicators work
equally well at the first stage. However, second-stage results very much depend
on the exact measure employed as instrument. Overall, we find little evidence
that bilateral trust aﬀects international movements of goods and labor. More
generally, we highlight the potential fragility of IV estimations even when the
instruments seem plausible on theoretical grounds and when standard statistical
tests confirm their validity.
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1 Introduction
The study of the eﬀects of trust for international trade is rooted in the general notion
that economic exchange is often characterized by asymmetric information which can
lead to opportunistic behavior. To prevent this type of behavior, contracts define the
obligations of all implied parties. However, contracts are by nature incomplete as it
is too costly to take into account or even know all contingencies when establishing
them. Furthermore, it can be diﬃcult to monitor and enforce contracts, especially in
international trade where the commercial partners are established in diﬀerent jurisdic-
tions (Rodrik, 2000). As a result, successful trade opportunities might not be realized,
unless the parties trust each other (Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1972; Putnam, 1993; Grief,
1993, 2000; Coleman, 1994; Kallock, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Paldam, 2000). When
trade partners are confident that they will not be cheated on, they divert less resources
to negotiate, monitor, and enforce contracts (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Dyer and Chu,
2003). By mitigating these transaction costs, the trust citizens of the country importing
goods have towards citizens of their partner country, denoted by "Destination-to-Source
(DtS) trust", may enhance profitability of trade opportunities and thereby increase the
volume of international trade.
In fact, empirical evidence by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009, henceforth GSZ)
suggests that DtS trust has a significant and economically important causal eﬀect on
international trade. To address endogeneity concerns, GSZ isolate the exogenous vari-
ation of bilateral trust with two measures of cultural proximity of country-pairs, an
indicator of genetic ("somatic") distance and a measure of religious similarity. By do-
ing so, their instrumental variables (IV) estimations overturn the result of estimating
a standard gravity-type trade regression with trust as an additional regressor via OLS.
The significant point-estimates of the IV coeﬃcients on bilateral trust are more than
five times larger than their insignificant OLS counterparts. This increase might simply
reflect the reduction of the bias that distorts the OLS coeﬃcient of the potentially en-
dogenous trust variable. Nevertheless, it could equally indicate that there is a problem
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with the instrumentation strategy, statistical tests notwithstanding.1
First, this paper reconsiders the relationship between trust and international trade
by using seven alternative measures of somatic distance to the one used by GSZ.2 In
fact, the researcher has a large degree of freedom when constructing an indicator of
somatic distance. All of our indicators measure physical dissimilarities between the
"average" individual of two countries. They exploit the notion that individuals who
look less alike tend to trust each other less. At the same time, physical dissimilarities
per se should not have an impact on trade in a way other than through their eﬀect on
bilateral trust.
We find that all of our alternative measures of somatic distance are highly corre-
lated with the endogenous trust variable in a similar fashion than the somatic distance
variable originally used by GSZ. Moreover, there is no indication of weak identification
problems. It should thus not matter for consistent estimates which somatic distance
measure we choose to instrument bilateral trust with. Using the indicator of GSZ, we
find that an increase of one standard deviation in instrumented DtS trust increases
aggregated export flows on average by 24 percent, which basically replicates their orig-
inal finding. However, the coeﬃcients of bilateral trust become insignificant as soon
as we do not use the original indicator by GSZ. With all of our seven alternative indi-
cators, the size of coeﬃcients on instrumented bilateral trust in the trade regressions
declines considerably, sometimes even becoming negative. Moreover, the coeﬃcients
on the alternative instruments are never significantly diﬀerent from zero in the reduced
form where trade flows are regressed on them. Generally, this suggests that the en-
dogenous variable has no eﬀect on the dependent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
1For instance, as discussed by GSZ themselves, religion may shape institutions and thus may aﬀect
international trade and other forms of international economic exchange not only through the trust
channel. In this case, religious similarity should not be used as an instrument. Therefore, we define
an alternative specification including religious similarity as a regressor, focusing on somatic distance
measures as instruments.
2Three of them are made available in the online-appendix of the paper by GSZ (Guiso et al., 2008a),
but are not used in the published version of the paper. Our sensitivity analysis is motivated by the
following statement by Murray (2006, p. 119): "If the parameter estimates using diﬀerent instruments
diﬀer appreciably and seemingly significantly from one another, the validity of the instruments becomes
suspect."
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In sum, contrary to what has been suggested by GSZ, we conclude that a causal eﬀect
of bilateral trust on international trade is not supported by the data.
Motivated by this surprising result, second, we re-run our regressions by using
international migration rather than trade as dependent variable at the second stage.3
Potentially, trust in the citizens of a host country may have an impact on the decision
to migrate to a foreign country. Generally, in the absence of important barriers to
migration, individuals only migrate to a foreign country if expected migration benefits
exceed expected migration costs (Roy, 1951; Sjaastad, 1962; Anderson, 1979; Borjas,
1987, 1989; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). Both benefits and costs may be monetary,
such as a higher income in the host country or physical moving costs. They can also
be of social or psychological nature. However, forming expectations on such migration
costs and benefits is diﬃcult. Migrants are generally not fully aware of the social,
political, institutional, and cultural environment of potential host countries. In such a
context, their decision to migrate may also rely on the trust they have in citizens of the
destination country. This bilateral trust, which we refer to as "Source-to-Destination
(StD) trust", might change the way expectations on costs and benefits of moving abroad
are formed. Thus, there is reason to believe that StD trust directly aﬀects international
migration by changing its expected net return. Likewise, the trust that citizens from
the destination country grant citizens from the source country, the DtS trust, may
play a role in the migration decision. For instance, it may aﬀect immigration policies
towards specific countries or regions.
We measure international migration by the gross immigration flows taken from a
unique panel data set established by Ortega and Peri (2009, 2011). The pattern which
emerges from estimating the relationship between these migration flows and bilateral
trust is very similar to our results for trade. When using the original somatic distance
indicator by GSZ as instrument, we find that bilateral trust has a significant and
positive eﬀect on international migration. More precisely, the results suggest that an
increase in StD trust or DtS trust of one standard deviation increases immigration
3GSZ studied the eﬀect of trust on investment flows, in addition to trade flows, but did not consider
migration.
3
flows on average by 67 percent and 53 percent, respectively. However, when using the
seven alternative and equally valid measures of somatic distance as instruments, we are
unable to find a significant and quantitatively important eﬀect of trust on migration
flows.
This paper is part of a growing literature that analyzes the role of trust for economic
outcomes. Prior research suggests various channels through which trust influences
economic activity.4 Comparing Italian regions, Putnam (1993) finds that trust increases
participation in social activities, facilitates cooperation, and improves the eﬀectiveness
of institutions.5 More recently, empirical studies show that trust fosters economic
development and growth also through its positive eﬀect on total factor productivity
(Bjornskov, 2010), on financial development (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008b), and on the rate
of investment (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001. Algan and Cahuc (2010)
and Tabellini (2010) find a causal eﬀect of inherited and historically determined trust
on economic growth. These studies exploit the variation of generalized trust across
countries (proposed by the World Values Surveys) to identify its role for diﬀerential
economic outcomes. By contrast, we are concerned with the eﬀects of bilateral trust
on bilateral movement of goods and labor between two countries. To the best of
our knowledge, none has yet examined the impact of trust on international migration
patterns, a gap that we want to fill in this study.
Our paper hence also contributes to the literature on the determinants of interna-
tional migration. Since Ravenstein (1885) presented his law of migration, economists
devoted considerable energies to study the migration decision. Many empirical papers
analyzing migration patterns such as Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2007), Peder-
sen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008), Mayda (2010), Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011),
Grogger and Hanson (2011), and Beine and Parons (2012) are based on the income
4As already asserted by Arrow (1972, p. 357): “Virtually every commercial transaction has within
itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence."
5On trust and institutions, see also La Porta et al. (1997), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), Bjornskov
(2006), Tabellini (2008, 2010), Bloom, Sadun and Reeen (2009), and Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and
Shleifer (2010).
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maximization approach originated by Roy (1951). Our framework is similar to these
recent contributions which use gravity-type frameworks to analyze various determi-
nants of international migration but in contrast to this literature focusses on bilateral
trust.
Finally, our paper highlights potential fragility of IV estimations. Although the
standard statistical tests aﬃrm that the applied IV strategies are equally valid and
that the instruments are suﬃciently strong, we find that small changes in the construc-
tion of an instrument can fundamentally change the results. Our analysis highlights
the importance of performing sensitivity analysis with alternative instruments, even
when an instrument seems plausible on econometric and theoretical grounds. This is
especially true when there is a large degree of freedom in constructing the instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the causal
eﬀect of bilateral (DtS) trust on international trade and presents the empirical model,
the data, and the results of the sensitivity analysis. Section 3 reports the results of
regressing international migration on StD and DtS trust, using a similar identification
strategy. The last section concludes.
2 Bilateral Trust and International Trade
In this section, we examine the eﬀects of Destination-to-Source (DtS) trust on com-
modity export flows. We first estimate the specification suggested by GSZ with data
constructed and collected following their instructions. Moreover, we follow their iden-
tification strategy and use their specific measure of somatic distance as an instrument
for bilateral trust. In a second step, we investigate the robustness of their results by
estimating alternative specifications based on alternative indicators of somatic distance
which are equally well correlated with DtS trust.
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2.1 Identification
To analyze the relationship between DtS trust and international trade, GSZ focus on
a specification that takes the following form:6
() = 0 + 1 +X0γ +  +  +  (1)
where the dependent variable, (), is the natural logarithm of the aggregated
commodity export flows from country  to country  in year  and  is the
DtS trust observed in year . X0 is a vector of time-invariant bilateral variables
which capture trade costs (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). It includes a variable
measuring the geographical distance between two countries and dummy variables that
take the value 1 when two countries share a border, an oﬃcial language, or when their
legal system has the same origin. Following GSZ, we further include an indicator of
press coverage that measures how many times a partner country was mentioned in
the national newspapers, a proxy for transportation costs, and a measure of linguistic
common roots. The variable can take values between zero and one: it is one when
two countries share an oﬃcial language, zero when the two oﬃcial languages come
from diﬀerent language families, and it takes values between zero and one when the
oﬃcial languages share some common nods.  and  are time-varying country
dummies which account for country- and time-specific determinants of international
trade. According to Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), these dummies are supposed to
eliminate the bias stemming from the omission of what Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003, 2004) call "multilateral resistance" to trade.7 The last term in equation (1),
6This equation is closely related to the standard gravity regression. Since the gravity model was
given a theoretical foundation by Anderson (1979), it has been widely used to analyze economic
outcomes and it fits the data remarkably well. For a short overview of the origin of the gravity model
and the corresponding literature see also Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006), Anderson (2011), and Head and Mayer (2013).
7As explained by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 170), " [...] after controlling for size,
trade between two regions is decreasing in their bilateral trade barrier relative to the average barrier
of the two regions to trade with all their partners. Intuitively, the more resistant to trade with all
others a region is, the more it is pushed to trade with a given bilateral partner. We will refer to the
theoretically appropriate average trade barrier as ‘multilateral resistance’."
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, is a mean-zero random variable accounting for random shocks.
The inclusion of pair-specific variables and time varying country dummies partially
addresses potential mis-specification caused by omitted variables but the OLS esti-
mate of DtS trust (1) might still be inconsistent because of measurement error or
simultaneous causality. In order to identify the causal relationship between bilateral
trust and international trade, GSZ instrument the endogenous variable with a proxy
of religious similarity and an indicator of somatic distance which measures the dis-
tance between three anthropometric characteristics observed in the native populations
of two countries: the average height, the prevailing hair color, and the average cephalic
index, which measures the average width and length of an individual’s skull. In an
experiment, DeBruine (2002) finds that people trust other people who resemble them-
selves significantly more. We hence expect a decrease in somatic distance to increase
international trade through its positive eﬀect on bilateral trust. The second instru-
ment, religious similarity, measures the probability that a randomly picked individual
in country  has the same religion as a randomly picked individual in country . As
religion may shape beliefs, it may positively aﬀect bilateral trust. However, we suspect
religious similarity to capture also other cultural and institutional variables that foster
international trade. If religious similarity does not satisfy the exclusion restrictions,
i.e. if it aﬀects the dependent variables other than through bilateral trust, then it is
not a valid instrumental variable and must be included as a control variable in the
trade regression. We therefore also estimate alternative specifications in which the
vector X0 contains the measure of religious similarity. In these cases, bilateral trust
is instrumented only with an indicator of somatic distance.
When estimating the trade equations, we compute standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity of unknown and arbitrary form. Moreover, we cluster at the country-
pair which allows the standard errors to be correlated over time within country-pairs,
but assumes that they are uncorrelated with errors of a diﬀerent country-pair. The
data used to analyze equation (1) is described next.
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2.2 Data
The aggregated commodity export flows are collected by the International Merchandise
Trade Statistics Section (IMTS) of the United Nations Statistics Division. It standard-
izes data delivered by national statistical authorities and continuously updates the UN
Comtrade Database which contains detailed statistics on the import and export of
commodities for over 250 countries and areas.8 These aggregated commodity export
flows are regressed on DtS trust, an indicator proposed by the Eurobarometer Surveys.
These surveys are mandated by the European Commission in order to have a better
understanding of the public opinion in the European Member States. To reach this
objective, approximately 1,000 individuals per Member State are interviewed yearly
since 1970 using a common questionnaire. The question of interest for our paper is: "I
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very
much trust, or no trust at all." It was first asked in the year 1970 in five European
countries. From 1970 to 1996, it reappeared ten times in the standard Eurobarometer
Surveys and the country sample increased each time.9 In 1996, citizens of 17 European
countries were asked to indicate the trust they had towards citizens of 25 EU and
Non-EU countries. For reasons of homogeneity, we follow GSZ and focus on European
countries only. We construct the bilateral trust indicator analogously to GSZ by coding
the answers to this question the following way: 1 (no trust at all), 2 (not very much
trust), 3 (some trust), 4 (a lot of trust). In a next step, we compute the average level
of bilateral trust for each country-pair by taking the mean value of the answers in each
year for which we have survey data.
The dyadic dummy variables included in equation (1) come from the CEPII Grav-
8In the UN Comtrade Database, the commodities are classified according to the Stan-
dard International Trade Classification (SITC), the Harmonized Commodity Coding System
(HS), and The Broad Economic Categories (BEC). The data can be downloaded from
http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. Unfortunately, we cannot include data on trade in services
as this data is only collected since the year 2000.
9The data can be downloaded from the ZACAT-GESIS Online Study catalogue,
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/. The bilateral trust question was asked in the Eurobarometer
Survey of the years 1970, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996.
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ity Dataset generated by Head, Mayer and Ries (2010, 2013).10 The measure of geo-
graphical distance between countries was established by Mayer and Zignago (2011).11
As proxy for trade costs, GSZ use the indicator for geographical distance proposed by
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) which measures the (log) distance in kilometers between
two capital cities. It assumes that the whole population is concentrated in one geo-
graphical point, thereby failing to capture the distribution of economic activity within
a country. Head and Mayer (2002) argue that the inclusion of this distance measures
in a gravity-type equation systematically inflates the estimated border eﬀect because
it overestimates the geographical distances within a country relative to international
distances. Therefore, we only use it to replicate the results of GSZ. In the rest of
the paper, we focus on the population-weighted distance indicator provided by Mayer
and Zignago (2011), which calculates the "distances between two countries based on
bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries, those inter-city
distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population"
(p. 11).
GSZ provided us with their indicator of press coverage12 and we reconstruct the
proxies for transportation costs and for linguistic common roots following the instruc-
tions given by GSZ. As proxy for transportation costs we use the estimates for shipping
costs made available on line by the Import Export Wizard.13 The data employed to
compute the commonality of two oﬃcial languages comes from "The Ethnologue".14
The indicator of somatic distance used as an instrumental variable for bilateral
10It can be downloaded from www.cepii.fr.
11See http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6.
12As outlined by GSZ (p. 1106), the measure of press coverage was established in the following way:
“In Factiva, we searched the newspaper with the highest circulation for each country. For each pair
of countries i and j, we recorded the number of articles in the newspaper of countries that mentioned
country j or its citizens in the headline. We divided this number by the number of total news stories on
foreign countries". Factiva is an online research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company. It collects and
archives informations made available by over 30’000 newspapers, journals, magazines, web pages, etc.
on a broad range of contents. It aggregates information from over 200 countries. See www.factiva.com.
13The Import-Export Wizard is a Internet page which estimate the price of shipping or flying a good
from one country to another. We downloaded the prices of shipping a 1.000kg unspecified freight type
load with no special handling in June 2011. See http://importexportwizard.com. GSZ based this
measure on Giuliano, Spilimbergo, and Tonon (2006).
14See www.ethnologue.com and the printed version edited by Lewis et al. (2013).
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trust can be constructed in many diﬀerent ways. Four measures are made available in
the online-appendix to the paper by GSZ (Guiso et al., 2008a).15 They are constructed
based on four anthropometric indicators: hair color, cephalic index, height, and skin
color. The first three anthropometric indicators were published by Biasutti (1959). He
classifies the world into five categories of hair colors: 1 (blond prevails), 2 (mix of blond
and dark), 3 (dark prevails), 4 (sporadic presence of blond), and 5 (exclusively dark).
He further diﬀerentiates five categories of average cephalic indexes, going from 71.0 to
86+, and six categories of height. For illustration, Figure 1 reprints the distribution of
the average cephalic index for European regions.
Using today’s borders, many countries fall into several classes of these traits, in
which case GSZ focus on the predominant category and ignore the others. They at-
tribute scores to the diﬀerent groups of hair color, cephalic index, height, and skin
color, and "compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of the ab-
solute value of the diﬀerence in each of these traits" (GSZ, p. 1107). Their constructed
four measures of somatic distance are all computed in the same fashion but they are
based on diﬀerent combinations of these four physical characteristics. One measure of
somatic distance sums the absolute distance in all four dimensions. The sole measure
used in the study of GSZ ignores the diﬀerence in skin color. A third measure is based
on diﬀerences in hair color, height, and skin color. Finally, another measure only sums
the absolute diﬀerences in hair color and height.
We construct four additional measures of somatic distance. To do this, we attribute
the score of 1 to the category corresponding to the lowest average cephalic index (71.0
- 74.9), 2 to the second category (75.0 - 78.9), and so on. The six categories of height
defined by Biasutti (1959) are coded the same way, attributing the lowest score of 1
to the category "157.9 cm or less" and the highest score of 6 to "178 cm or more".
In a first step, we follow exactly the instructions given by Guiso et al. (2008a, p.
3) and try to replicate the single measure of somatic distance used in GSZ. As it
is hardest to define which category of cephalic index prevails, our second measure is
15These measures can be downloaded from Paola Sapienza’s web page under
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/sapienza/htm/somaticdistance.zip.
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the Average Cephalic Index in Europe 
 
Source : Biasutti, R. (1959), p. 48 
based only on the absolute diﬀerences in hair color and height. The next two measures
diﬀer from the others by allowing a country to fall into two categories and weight
them according to population density.16 One measure is again based on the three
anthropometric indicators proposed by Biasutti while the other ignores the diﬀerences
in cephalic index. The data on population density comes from two figures: a map
with the population density in 1989 provided by the European Environment Agency
and one with the population density in 2010 made available by the Nordic Center for
Spatial Development.17
The indicator of religious similarity used to capture the exogenous part of bilateral
trust is constructed with data from the World Value Surveys presented by Guiso et al.
(2003). They report the national distribution of population by the following religious
aﬃliation: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, no religious aﬃli-
ation and other aﬃliations. We use this information to compute the probability that
two randomly picked individuals in two diﬀerent countries have the same religion.
The descriptive statistics of the samples used to analyze the relationship between
international trade and DtS trust are presented in Panel A of Table 1.18
16For some countries, we find it very diﬃcult to decide which trait is prevailing, especially when
focusing on the diﬀerent categories of cephalic index. For example, in Figure 1 we see that northern
Germany falls into category 3, “79.0 - 82.9", while the other half of Germany falls into category 4,
“83.0 - 86.9". Guiso et al. (2008a) do not indicate how they decide which one of these categories
prevails in such situations. We partially succeed to replicate their somatic distances when we decide
visually (based on Figure 1) which trait covers a larger area and assume that it is the dominant char-
acteristic. However, this procedure is somewhat arbitrary, especially when ignoring the distribution of
the population. As the German population is approximately equally distributed, we would ignore the
characteristics of half of the population if we arbitrarily decided that either category 3 or 4 prevails.
To account for this, our two measures of somatic distance allow a country to be home of two cate-
gories of traits, depending on the distribution of the population. Concretely, in the case of Germany
we find that the categories of cephalic index 3 (“79.0 - 82.9") and 4 (“83.0 - 86.9") roughly share the
German territory and population. Therefore, we decide to attribute it the score of 3.5. This measure
is certainly not flawless but it allows us to further explore the robustness of the results published by
GSZ.
17See Stanners, D. and Bourdeau, Ph. (1994) or www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-827-
5122-8/page008.html for the chart on population density in 1989 and Roto, J. (2011) or
www.nordregio.se/en/Maps—graphs/ for the population density in 2010.
18We follow GSZ by only including observations for countries that were members of the European
Economic Area before 1997 and for Norway.
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Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max N
Export flows (from source to destination, log) 14.56 14.63 1.64 9.57 17.88 679
DtS Trust 2.73 2.72 0.28 1.99 3.65 679
Press Coverage 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.31 679
Weighted Distance (log) 7.00 7.06 0.55 5.08 8.13 679
Distance between capitals (log) 6.90 7.07 0.69 5.15 8.12 679
Transportation costs (log) 5.19 5.18 0.07 5.08 5.42 679
Common border 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 679
Common language 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 679
Same legal origin 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 679
Linguistic common roots 0.63 0.67 0.20 0.00 1.00 679
Religious similarity 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.87 679
Somatic Distance
Available in Guiso et al. (2008a), sum of the absolute differences in the following prevailing traits
- hair color, height, cephalic index, skin 2.93 3.00 1.37 0.00 6.00 679
- hair color, height, skin 2.05 2.00 1.29 0.00 5.00 679
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.48 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 679
- hair color, height 1.60 2.00 1.08 0.00 4.00 679
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.35 2.00 1.21 0.00 5.00 679
- hair color, height 1.48 2.00 0.96 0.00 3.00 679
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.15 2.00 1.15 0.00 4.50 679
- hair color, height 1.47 1.50 1.04 0.00 3.00 679
Gross Immigraiton Flows (log) 6.84 6.84 1.87 2.08 12.13 450
StD Trust 2.79 2.79 0.30 1.99 3.65 450
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 0.34 0.18 0.66 -0.62 3.55 450
Common language 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 450
Weighted Distance (log) 6.91 7.01 0.62 5.08 8.13 450
Common border 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 450
Same legal origin 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 450
Migration Stock 1960 (log) 4.86 0.00 5.56 0.00 13.50 450
Religious similarity 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.87 450
Somatic Distance
Available from Guiso et al. (2008a), sum of the absolute differences in the following prevailing traits
- hair color, height, cephalic index, skin 2.87 3.00 1.40 0.00 6.00 450
- hair color, height, skin 2.11 2.00 1.34 0.00 5.00 450
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.43 3.00 1.18 0.00 5.00 450
- hair color, height 1.67 2.00 1.09 0.00 4.00 450
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.35 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 450
- hair color, height 1.56 2.00 0.97 0.00 3.00 450
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.10 2.00 1.13 0.00 4.50 450
- hair color, height 1.51 1.50 1.03 0.00 3.00 450
Panel B International Migration and Source-to-Destination Trust
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A International Trade and Destination-to-Source Trust
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max N
Gross Immigraiton Flows (log) 6.84 6.82 1.87 2.08 12.13 463
DtS Trust 2.76 2.75 0.30 2.04 3.65 463
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 0.38 0.19 0.70 -0.62 3.55 463
Common language 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 463
Weighted Distance (log) 6.91 7.01 0.62 5.08 8.13 463
Common border 0.21 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 463
Same legal origin 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 463
Migration Stock 1960 (log) 5.04 0.00 5.57 0.00 13.50 463
Religious similarity 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.87 463
Somatic Distance
Available from Guiso et al. (2008a), sum of the absolute differences in the following prevailing traits
- hair color, height, cephalic index, skin 2.88 3.00 1.40 0.00 6.00 463
- hair color, height, skin 2.12 2.00 1.34 0.00 5.00 463
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.44 3.00 1.19 0.00 5.00 463
- hair color, height 1.68 2.00 1.09 0.00 4.00 463
Own elaboration, following the instructions in Guiso et al. (2008a)
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.37 2.00 1.20 0.00 5.00 463
- hair color, height 1.57 2.00 0.97 0.00 3.00 463
Own elaboration, allowing for a country to fall into two categories of
- hair color, height, cephalic index 2.11 2.00 1.14 0.00 4.50 463
- hair color, height 1.52 1.50 1.03 0.00 3.00 463
Panel C International Migration and Destination-to-Source Trust
Notes . This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used to estimate the effect of DtS trust on
commodity export flows (Panel A), the impact of StD trust on gross immigration flows (Panel B), and the
effect of DtS trust on gross immigration flows (Panel C). The data sources are described in sections 2.2 and
3. All samples include observations for European countries over the years for which we have trust data (1970,
1976, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1996). The number of observations varies across the
panels because of missing data.
Table 1 continued
2.3 Results
Table 2 present the result of estimating equation (1). In Panel A, we use a similar
indicator of geographical distance between countries as GSZ (distance between two
capital cities). In this case, we find coeﬃcients on bilateral trust that are very similar
to the ones published in their study.19 The coeﬃcient on geographical distance is barely
significant, however. Yet, as discussed in section 2.2, we suspect this measure to be
inadequate and we therefore replace it by the outlined population-weighted distance
indicator in Panel B. The coeﬃcient on bilateral distances now becomes significant
and has a point-estimate close to -1 which corresponds to the magnitude generally
estimated in trade regressions that are based on the gravity model (Meyer and Zignago,
2011, p. 11). We also observe that the estimated border eﬀect decreases compared to
Panel A, supporting the conjecture made by Head and Mayer (2002) that measuring
geographical distance by the distance between capital cities inflates the border eﬀect.
More importantly, we find that, when including a weighted measure of distance in the
specification, the point estimates of the coeﬃcients on DtS trust decrease. In fact, the
positive OLS estimates reported in columns (1) to (3) of Panel B are insignificant.
Next, we apply the IV approach proposed by GSZ as DtS trust seems to be cor-
related with the error term.20 When instrumented with both the measure of religious
similarity and the measure of somatic distance used in GSZ, the coeﬃcient on DtS
trust becomes significant at the 5 percent level (column (4)).21 It suggests that an in-
crease in DtS trust of one standard deviation increases aggregated commodity export
flows on average by 24 percent which is more than six times the eﬀect predicted by
the OLS estimate. This large jump might simply reflect the fact that we accounted for
endogeneity bias. However, we need to examine the validity of the applied IV approach
before concluding that it represents the true causal relationship of interest. In fact,
19Compare to Table IV in GSZ (pp. 1116f).
20We verify the endogeneity of bilateral trust with a control function approach (see Wooldridge,
2010, p. 127) and perform an endogeneity test that is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, following
Baum, Schaﬀer and Stillman (2007). Both tests allow us to reject the null hypothesis at conventional
levels which states that bilateral trust is exogenous.
21This IV approach reports the eﬃcient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates and the
cluster-robust standard errors.
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OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S OLS-RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  Distance between Capital Cities
DtS trust 0.37* 0.29 0.28 1.27*** 1.50***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.38) (0.50)
Common language 0.45** 0.26 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.30*
(0.21) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Distance between capitals (log) -0.05 -0.26 -0.24 -0.32* -0.30* -0.22
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Common border 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.34***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Press coverage 1.37 0.57 0.66 1.57 1.21 0.81
(1.12) (1.11) (1.12) (0.96) (1.05) (1.17)
Transportation costs (log) -4.41** -1.82 -1.82 -0.09 -0.43 -1.43
(1.97) (1.90) (1.85) (1.65) (1.72) (1.82)
Same legal origin 0.45*** 0.39** 0.32** 0.38** 0.34**
(0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
Linguistic common roots 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.12
(0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
Religious similarity -0.19 0.05
(0.22) (0.16)
Somatic Distance used in GSZ -0.09***
(0.03)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 17.91 16.5
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 17.05 26.03
Over-identification
Hansen J -Stat 0.780
(p-value) (0.38)
Panel B: Population-Weighted Distance Measure
DtS trust 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.85** 0.96**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.35) (0.47)
Common language 0.38** 0.24** 0.25** 0.25** 0.24** 0.30**
(0.16) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Weighted Distance (log) -0.88*** -1.03*** -1.04*** -0.94*** -0.91*** -0.99***
(0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23)
Common border 0.29*** 0.24** 0.24** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.21**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Press coverage 0.13 -1.01 -1.06 -0.34 -0.42 -0.80
(1.05) (0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (0.93) (0.98)
Transportation costs (log) 0.42 2.27 2.31 2.48 2.27 2.49
(1.91) (1.66) (1.68) (1.57) (1.68) (1.66)
Same legal origin 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Linguistic common roots -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15
(0.32) (0.28) (0.28) (0.31)
Religious similarity -0.06 0.11
(0.19) (0.14)
Somatic Distance used in GSZ -0.06*
(0.03)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 16.95 14.65
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 16.93 22.99
Over-identification
Hansen J -Stat 0.13
(p-value) (0.72)
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97
Table 2
Trade Regression
Notes . The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of aggregated export flows from country s  to country d  (UNComtrade). DtS Trust  measures the average 
trust that citizens in importing country d  grant citizens in exporting country s  (Eurobarometer Surveys). Somatic distance is the measure used in GSZ which sums 
the absolut value of the difference in the hair color, height, and cephalic index. All equations include countr-year dummies. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM and Wald 
statistics are the robust statistics in case of non-i.i.d. disturbances. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, that are clustered at the country-pair. 
Coefficients are statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. Columns (1) to (3) present OLS estimates; columns (4) and (5) present 
IV/GMM estimates with somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments (IV-SR) and with somatic distance as only instrument (IV-S), respectively. RF 
(column (6)) refers to the reduced form of the dependent variable (see appendix).
both measures of cultural proximity of country-pairs are significant in the first-stage
regression. Bilateral trust seems to increase with religious similarity and decrease when
physical dissimilarities between two countries become more important. The -value of
the Kleibergen-Paap  LM Statistic also suggests that the instruments are jointly sig-
nificant in the first stage of the 2SLS regression.22 In addition, the Wald statistic based
on the Kleinbergen-Paap  statistic is larger than 10, indicating a suﬃciently "strong"
correlation between the instruments and DtS trust in order not to worry about weak
identification problems.23 Finally, the instruments pass the Hansen -test intended to
verify their exogeneity, i.e. that the instruments only aﬀect the dependent variable
through the trust channel.
The standard statistical tests hence suggest that the IV strategy used by GSZ
is valid. Nevertheless, we suspect religious similarity to aﬀect international trade also
through other channels than bilateral trust. This sheds doubts on the results presented
in column (4) and also on the over-identification test, as the latter is only reliable
when the instruments are valid (Murray, 2006). Therefore, we estimate an alternative
specification which includes religious similarity as a covariate and where the exogenous
variation of bilateral trust is captured with a single instrument, the indicator of somatic
distance used in GSZ. The results of estimating this specification are presented in
column (5). The coeﬃcient on DtS trust slightly increases and the significance is
unchanged, compared to column (4).
We further estimate the corresponding reduced-form equation of the dependent
variable. This equation is "derived by substituting the first-stage equation into the
22The Kleibergen-Paap  LM Statistic is the eﬃcient first-stage statistic used to verify the relevance
of the instruments when non-i.i.d. disturbances are assumed. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggest
that the model is identified, i.e. that the instruments are relevant.
23In the presence of i.i.d. disturbances, weak identification problems are detected with the Cragg-
Donald F -statistic which is compared to the critical values published by Stock and Yogo (2005).
However, in case of non-i.i.d. disturbances, the Kleinbergen-Paap  Wald statistic is the eﬃcient
statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Kleibergen and Schaﬀer, 2007; Baum, 2007). So far, no critical
values have been computed for this statistic and in practice it is usually compared to the threshold
number of 10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997); see also Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). As
a robustness test, we compute the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates of all
our 2SLS regressions and find that the bilateral trust coeﬃcients only slightly change in their size and
that the levels of statistical significance are identical to the IV/GMM estimates. The results of this
robustness analysis are available in an online appendix (Tables A.1 - A.3).
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causal relation of interest" (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 121).24 The first-stage
regression is
 = 0 + 1 +X0 +  +  +  (2)
where  is the indicator of somatic distance between country  and country  and
X0 contains all time-invariant bilateral exogenous covariates including the proxy for
religious similarity. Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging terms we find
() = (0 + 10) + 11 + (1 + )X0 + (1 + 1) +
(1 + 1) + (1 + )
≡  0 +  1 +X0+ ˆ + ˆ +  (3)
ˆ and ˆ are time varying national dummies, and  is the error term. If the
exclusion restriction is satisfied, then, by assumption, all variables in equation (3) are
orthogonal to the error term . This implies that OLS consistently estimates the
coeﬃcients and that testing whether  1 ≡ 11 = 0 is an alternative way of testing
the hypothesis that 1 = 0 in equation (1). As Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 213)
point out, "if you can’t see the causal relation of interest in the reduced form, it’s
probably not there". Column (6) reports the results of estimating the reduced-form
equation (3). As expected from the second-stage results, we see that the coeﬃcient
on somatic distance is significant, though only at the 10 percent level. Furthermore,
religious similarity is not correlated with international trade, a finding which comforts
us in our decision to estimate an alternative specification that includes the proxy for
religious similarity as control variable.
The disadvantage of instrumenting DtS trust with a single instrument is that we
have no means to statistically verify its exogeneity anymore. In such situations, Murray
(2006) proposes to estimate the regression of interest again, using separately alternative
24See Anderson and Rubin (1949), Dufour (2003), and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) for a
formal explanation of this alternative test and Angrist and Krueger (1991, 2001) for an application
of this method. See also Baum et al. (2007) for an implementation of the Anderson-Rubin test in
Stata. This test verifies whether the instruments are significant in the reduced form equation of the
dependent variable.
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instruments and to observe how the coeﬃcient on the endogenous variable behaves. If
this procedure yields estimates that only vary insignificantly from one another, then
the credibility of the instrumental variable is strengthened. Such a sensitivity analysis
can be performed here as there is a large degree of freedom in constructing a measure
of somatic distance. The diﬀerent indicators of somatic distance described in section
2.2 all capture the physical dissimilarities between two countries and are constructed
in a similar fashion. It should therefore not matter for consistent results which one
of them is used to capture the exogenous variation of bilateral trust. To examine the
robustness of the results reported in Table 2, we hence estimate equation (1) again,
keeping the same sample and the same explanatory variables. We vary, however, the
measure of somatic distance that we use as instrument for DtS trust. The results of
this sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 3.25
Table 3 is divided in four panels. Panel A reports the results of estimating the
first-stage regression and Panel B of estimating the reduced-form equation (3). The IV
coeﬃcients without and with religious similarity as explanatory variable are presented
in Panel C and Panel D, respectively. Each panel is composed of eight columns which
diﬀer in the indicator of somatic distance employed as instrument for DtS trust. We
start with the four indicators made available by Guiso et. al (2008a). Columns (1) of
Panel B, C and D restate the most important results presented in Table 2 (columns
(6), (4) and (5), respectively), where we employ the somatic distance measure actually
used in GSZ, i.e. the sum of the absolute values of the diﬀerence in hair color, height,
and cephalic index (HHC) of two average citizens living in distinct countries. Column
(2) is based on a somatic distance measure that additionally considers the diﬀerences in
the skin color (HHCS). For column (3), the diﬀerences in the cephalic index (HHS) are
ignored. The measure used for column (4) sums the absolute diﬀerences in hair color
and height (HH). For columns (5) and (6), we use the measures of somatic distance
that we constructed ourselves following the instructions given in Guiso et al. (2008a),
25We only report the coeﬃcients on DtS trust, somatic distance, and religious similarity. Complete
tables including the estimates of the coeﬃcients on the control variables are available in an online
appendix (Tables B.1 - B.3).
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Religious similarity 0.18*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.14** 0.15** 0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Somatic distance -0.06* -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Religious similarity 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
DtS trust 0.85** 0.69** 0.46 0.35 0.20 0.55 0.55 0.69*
(0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 16.95 23.58 19.89 23.33 18.46 20.40 15.27 20.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 16.93 21.27 19.95 21.30 13.48 21.58 15.74 20.80
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02
(p-value) (0.72) (0.90) (0.80) (0.65) (0.45) (0.91) (0.91) (0.90)
DtS trust 0.96** 0.74 0.39 0.17 -0.17 0.49 0.50 0.75
(0.47) (0.51) (0.44) (0.52) (0.57) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 14.65 20.97 17.65 19.93 11.88 16.72 14.74 18.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 22.99 28.22 27.99 30.45 15.20 27.60 16.50 24.89
R-squared 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70
Observations 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679
Panel A: First-Stage Regression
Table 3
Trade Regression: Instrumenting DtS Trust with Alternative Measures of Somatic Distance
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Dependent Variable: Aggregated Export Flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the dependent
variable (Panel B), the IV/GMM coefficients of estimating equation (1) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables of cultural
proximity of country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic distance (Panel
D). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1) to (4) we use the
indicators made available by Guiso et al. (2008a), in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given by
them, and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are labeled with the letters H , 
C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. The coefficients of the control variables (the same as in
Table 2) are not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are statistically different from
zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Dependent Variable: Destination-to-Source Trust
Panel B: Reduced Form Equation of International trade
Dependent Variable: Aggregated Export Flows
Panel C: Second-Stage Estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent Variable: Aggregated Export Flows
Panel D: Second-Stage Estimates using Somatic Distance as Instrument
first, trying to replicate the measure actually used in GSZ following their instructions
(column (5))26 and, second, disregarding the potentially problematic cephalic index.
Finally, the ones used for the last two columns take the distribution of the population
within a country into account, first, by accounting for the cephalic index (column (7)),
and, second, by disregarding it (column (8)).27
According to Panel A of Table 3, the first-stage OLS coeﬃcients on the instrumental
variables are significantly diﬀerent from zero in every column and the point-estimates
are similar across the various indicators within a row. Panel C and D present the
statistics that give indications on the validity of the instruments. According to these
statistics, all the instruments are equally relevant, exogenous, and strong. Therefore,
one may expect to find similar results in the reduced form and in the second stage,
no matter which IV strategy we choose to apply. However, this is not what we ob-
serve. When estimating the reduced-form equation (2), according to Panel B, we find
a significant coeﬃcient on somatic distance only in column (1) where we employ the
original indicator of GSZ. Consequently, the only IV coeﬃcients on DtS trust that
are significant in Panel C and in Panel D are the ones instrumented with the somatic
distance measure employed by GSZ. As soon as we use an alternative measure of so-
matic distance as instrument (columns (2)-(8)), the significance of the trust coeﬃcients
disappears and the magnitude decreases and even becomes negative.
The fact that DtS trust does not remain significant in the trade regression when
we instrument it with alternative measures of somatic distance that are equally valid
suggests that there is no causal relationship between bilateral trust and international
trade. The significant coeﬃcient on DtS trust found in GSZ and in column (1) of Table
3 might result from a statistical type 1 error, i.e. the null hypothesis 1 = 0 is rejected
although it applies.
In the next section, we use a similar framework to analyze the causal relationship
between bilateral trust and international migration. Applying the same sensitivity
analysis, we investigate the eﬀects of both DtS and StD trust.
26For several country-pairs, we did not manage to do so which may explain the diverging results.
27Recall the discussion in section 2.2.
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3 Bilateral Trust and International Migration
As exposed earlier, we have reasons to suspect bilateral trust to aﬀect international
migration. StD trust might influence the way expectations on costs and benefits of
moving abroad are shaped while DtS trust may, for example, aﬀect immigration policies
in the destination countries. These two measures of bilateral trust are highly correlated.
Therefore, in order to separately estimate the eﬀect that StD trust and DtS trust have
on international migration, we need to define two specifications:
() = 0 + 1 + 2∆ +X0 +  +  +  (4)
() = 0 + 1 + 2∆ +X0+  +  +  (5)
where the dependent variable, denoted by (), is the natural logarithm of the
(gross) immigration flows from country-of-origin  to country-of-destination  in period
.  and  stand for the StD and DtS trust observed in year , respectively.
∆ measures the percentage diﬀerence in the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita of two countries. We use this variable as a proxy for the wage diﬀerential between
a country-pair. X0 is a vector of bilateral time-invariant variables,  and  are
country-year fixed eﬀects, and  and  are mean-zero random variables accounting
for random shocks.
To estimate these specifications, we use data on immigration flows collected by
Ortega and Peri (2009, 2011). They merged and harmonized data sets gathered by
Mayda (2010), the United Nations, and the OECD (International Migration Database,
IMD) to establish an unbalanced panel of annual data on bilateral gross immigration
flows into 30 OECD countries from 1946 to 2008. This unique dataset details the legal
entry of foreign citizens who wish to be residents in an OECD country. Consistency
is ensured by verifying that immigrants are always defined on the same basis across
the database for each destination country. To complete the dataset, Ortega and Peri
(2009, 2011) interpolate observations in a limited number of cases28 and compute the
28They interpolate observations only when the missing value is situated between two years for which
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net immigration flows. They correct for the outflow of foreign citizens using the IMD
and the dataset on emigration stocks for the years 1990 and 2000 collected by Docquier,
Lowell and Marfouk (2007), who count as migrant all foreign-born individuals aged 25+
that live in a OECD country and class the emigrants by educational attainment and
gender.29 However, these net immigration flows are less precise than the gross flows
and only have a limited coverage. We therefore focus on the analysis of the impact of
bilateral trust on gross inflows of foreign nationals. The other variables are identical
to the ones used in the trade setting.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the sample used to analyze
the relationship between international migration and StD trust, and Panel C to regress
international migration on DtS trust. The number of observations varies across panels
because of missing data. We again focus on observations for European countries in the
years for which we have data on bilateral trust.
The results from estimating equations (4) and (5) are reported in Panel A and
Panel B of Table 4, respectively. The first three columns present standard OLS esti-
mates. They suggest that a one percent increase in the diﬀerence in GDP per capita
increases immigration flows on average by approximately two percent. This positive
and significant eﬀect is in line with the notion, typically supported by the data, that
international wage diﬀerentials aﬀect migration patterns. We also find that geograph-
ical distance between countries has a significant and negative eﬀect on the dependent
variable.30 Sharing the legal origin has a positive eﬀect.
The main finding from columns (1)-(3) is the absence of a significant correlation
between bilateral trust and immigration flows. In Column (1) of Panel A, the coeﬃcient
on StD trust is positive but rather small and not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
In Column (2), we include an indicator of the existing diaspora in the destination
countries. Beine et al. (2011) showed that an increase in the past stock of migrants
the observations are available.
29The dataset can be downloaded from Frédéric Docquier’s Homepage under
http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/oxlight.htm
30In this section, we always include the measure of weighted distance provided by Mayer and Zignago
(2011).
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OLS OLS OLS IV-SR IV-S RF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A  Source-to-Destination Trust
Trust (StD) 0.68 0.43 0.23 2.22** 2.40
(0.59) (0.60) (0.65) (0.93) (1.51)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 1.66* 2.07** 1.93** 2.50** 2.55** 2.01**
(0.86) (0.87) (0.84) (0.96) (1.02) (0.84)
Common language -0.24 -0.36 -0.27 -0.41 -0.42 -0.25
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.29) (0.35)
Weighted Distance (log) -0.70** -0.57* -0.55* -0.41 -0.41 -0.47
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
Common border 0.00 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.23
(0.34) (0.38) (0.38) (0.30) (0.29) (0.37)
Same legal origin 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.52* 0.54*** 0.56** 0.53**
(0.24) (0.23) (0.27) (0.20) (0.22) (0.26)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.33* 0.30* 0.24 0.23 0.32*
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.50 -0.08 0.43
(0.46) (0.56) (0.39)
Somatic Distance used in GSZ -0.09
(0.07)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 21.61 13.99
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 14.41 12.37
Over-identification
Hansen J -Stat 0.02
(p-value) (0.88)
Panel B  Destination-to-Source Trust
Trust (DtS) 0.62 0.33 0.22 1.78* 1.53
(0.57) (0.60) (0.62) (0.99) (1.02)
Diff. in GDP p.c. (%) 1.64* 2.05** 1.97** 2.01** 2.05*** 2.10**
(0.84) (0.84) (0.82) (0.78) (0.76) (0.81)
Common language -0.15 -0.30 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 -0.22
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.29) (0.29) (0.36)
Weighted Distance (log) -0.73** -0.61** -0.58* -0.51* -0.52** -0.50
(0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31)
Common border -0.04 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.22
(0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.28) (0.29) (0.37)
Same legal origin 0.57** 0.65*** 0.49* 0.51** 0.47** 0.51*
(0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26)
Mig. Stock 1960 (log) 0.31* 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.30*
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Religious similarity 0.46 0.25 0.36
(0.39) (0.33) (0.39)
Somatic Distance used in GSZ -0.08
(0.06)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.93 11.09
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 15.05 20.49
Over-identification
Hansen J -Stat 0.60
(p-value) (0.44)
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90
Notes . The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the migration flows from country s to country d (Ortega and Peri, 2009, 2011). Trust (StD)
measures the average trust that citizens in country s grant citizens in country d , and Trust (DtS) is the reciprocal trust (Eurobarometer Surveys). Somatic
distance is the measure used in GSZ which sums the absolute value on the difference in the hair color, height, and cephalic index. All equations include country-
year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at the country-pair. Coefficients are statistically different from zero at
the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level. Columns (1) - (3) present OLS estimates; columns (4) and (5) present IV estimates with somatic distance and religious
similarity as instruments (IV-SR) and with somatic distance as only instrument (IV-S), respectively. RF (column (6)) refers to the reduced form equation of the
dependent variables (see appendix).
Table 4
Determinants of Migration
in a country raises migration flows, possibly because a larger diaspora reduces costs
and risks migrants face when moving abroad. We capture such network eﬀects by a
proxy for the emigration stocks in 1960 as employed in Grossmann and Stadelmann
(2012). This variable ensures a lag of at least 10 years that exists between the proxy
and the observations included in our regression. It is itself significant and positive, as
found in previous studies. Adding it decreases the coeﬃcient of StD trust which is
still statistically insignificant. We observe the same pattern when including religious
similarity as control variable in column (3): it halves the coeﬃcient of StD trust and
slightly increases its standard error. The OLS estimates hence suggest that StD trust
is not significantly related to international migration.
We next, again, apply the IV estimation proposed in GSZ and perform a sensitivity
analysis to examine whether the IV strategies follow a similar pattern in the migration
setting as they followed in the trade setting. Using the somatic distance measure as
employed in GSZ and religious similarity as instruments, the coeﬃcient on StD trust
strongly increases compared to the OLS estimates and becomes significantly diﬀerent
from zero at the five percent level (column (4)). The employed instruments pass the
Hansen -test. The Kleinbergen-Paap  statistics suggest that they are relevant
and strong. Nevertheless, like for Table 2, there are several reasons to regard the
results in column (4) with caution. First, the IV estimate on StD trust is five times
larger than the OLS counterpart. It suggests that an increase in StD trust of one
standard deviation increases gross immigration flows on average by 66 percent, which
is a surprisingly large eﬀect in view of the OLS estimate. Second, religious similarity
may aﬀect international migration not exclusively through the trust channel. Finally,
the previous section suggests that the coeﬃcient on bilateral trust might not be robust
to the use of alternative measures of somatic distance as instruments.
To address these concerns, we first estimate an alternative specification which in-
cludes the proxy for religious similarity as explanatory variable. Column (5) reports
the results when we employ the indicator of somatic distance used in GSZ as sole in-
strumental variable. The IV coeﬃcient on StD trust is similar in magnitude but it
19
loses its significance. Column (6) reports the results from estimating a reduced-form
equation analogously to (3). It suggests that neither somatic distance nor religious sim-
ilarity are correlated with international migration in the reduced form. This absence
of correlation between the instrumental variables and the dependent variable as well
as the insignificant coeﬃcients found in columns (1)-(3) raise doubts on the finding in
column (4) that StD trust aﬀects a migrant’s decision to move abroad.
In Panel B of Table 4, the relationship between DtS trust and international mi-
gration is similar to the one observed in Panel A between StD trust and international
migration. In columns (1)-(3), the OLS estimates of the coeﬃcient of DtS trust are
positive but not statistically significant. Instrumenting DtS trust with indicators of
religious similarity and somatic distance in column (4) yields significant results, here
at the ten percent level, that are more than five times larger than their OLS counter-
parts. They suggest that an increase of DtS trust of one standard deviation increases
immigration flows on average by 56 percent. However, according to column (5), when
including religious similarity as a covariate of migration rather than as an instrument
for trust, the coeﬃcient on DtS trust becomes insignificant. Moreover, also similar to
Panel A, column (6) shows that the correlation between the instruments and interna-
tional migration is again insignificant in the reduced-form equation.
In view of these inconclusive results with respect to the relationship between bilat-
eral trust and international migration, we again exploit the fact that there is a large
degree of freedom in the definition of somatic distance and estimate regressions (4) and
(5) with the same covariates and the same sample again, only changing the somatic
distance indicator which we use as instrument. The results of this analysis are reported
in Table 5 for the relationship between international migration and StD trust, and in
Table 6 for its relationship with DtS trust.
In columns (1) of Panels B, C and D of Table 5 we restate the most important
results of Panel A in Table 4 (columns (6), (4) and (5), respectively). Panel A of
Table 5 additionally reports the first-stage coeﬃcients on somatic distance and religious
similarity when we regress StD trust on all included and excluded exogenous variables.
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Somatic distance -0.09 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Religious similarity 0.43 0.41 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.42 0.44
(0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.41)
StD trust 2.22** 1.84** 0.95 0.83 1.27 1.25 2.00** 1.71*
(0.93) (0.80) (0.83) (0.79) (0.85) (0.81) (0.89) (0.82)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 21.61 25.88 24.39 26.94 21.68 24.99 20.80 24.69
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 14.41 16.10 18.64 19.19 12.54 17.59 14.74 17.68
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.02 0.07 1.79 2.12 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.17
(p-value) (0.88) (0.80) (0.18) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.93) (0.68)
StD trust 2.40 1.60 -0.33 -0.47 -0.36 0.24 1.89 1.28
(1.51) (1.23) (1.30) (1.23) (1.79) (1.36) (1.50) (1.33)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.99 22.52 20.47 23.71 8.23 17.72 17.50 19.50
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 12.37 18.11 19.65 23.80 5.54 18.62 12.85 19.30
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the
dependent variable (Panel B), the IV/GMM coefficients of estimating equation (3) when StD trust is instrumented with both variables
of cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting StD trust only with a measure of somatic
distance (Panel D). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1)
to (4) we use the indicators made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given
by Guiso et al. (2008a), and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are labeled
with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. The coefficients of the control
variables (the same as in Table 2) are not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are
statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Panel C: Second-Stage Estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
Panel D: Second-Stage Estimates using Somatic Distance as Instrument
Table 5
Migration Regression: Instrumenting StD Trust with Alternative Measures of Somatic Distance
Guiso et al. (2008a) Replication Pop. Density
Panel A: First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Source-to-Destination Trust
Panel B: Reduced Form Equation of International Migration
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
As in the case where international trade flows are the dependent variable at the second
stage, we observe that the various measures of somatic distance are equally significant
at the first stage and that the coeﬃcients are similar across the diﬀerent columns.
However, that none of these indicators are correlated with international migration in
the reduced-form equation (Panel B) suggests that StD trust does not have a causal
impact on international migration.
Panel C reports second-stage results for the case where the eight measures of somatic
distance are used as instruments jointly with religious similarity. Whereas second-stage
estimates for the coeﬃcients on StD trust are significant in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8),
they are insignificant in the other columns. Given the questionable validity of religious
similarity as instrumental variable for bilateral trust, in Panel D, we report the trust
coeﬃcients when instrumenting StD trust solely with the measures of somatic distance
(again including religious similarity as a control variable). Consistent with the results
found in panel B, none of the estimations yield statistically significant coeﬃcients and
some even have a negative sign. Interestingly, the point estimate is again highest
and economically (though not statistically) most significant when using the somatic
distance measure originally used by GSZ as an instrument for StD trust.
Regarding the eﬀect of DtS trust on migration, Table 6 provides a sensitivity analy-
sis of the results in Panel B of Table 4. Column (1) of Panels B, C and D of Table 6
restate the most important results. According to Panel A of Table 6, all indicators of
somatic distance significantly aﬀect DtS trust at the five percent level. However, again,
none of them are correlated with international migration in the reduced-form equation
(Panel B). Panel C reports the IV estimates when using somatic distance and religious
similarity as instruments for DtS trust. Analogously to the results found in Panel C of
Table 5, we see that the tests suggest that the instruments are relevant and exogenous.
Moreover, the coeﬃcients on instrumented DtS trust are sometimes significant at the
second stage. However, according to Panel A, the indicator of religious similarity is
not correlated with DtS trust and, as repeatedly mentioned, a potentially problematic
instrument. Panel D of Table 6 shows the second-stage estimates when instrumenting
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HHC HH HHCS HHS HHC HH HHC HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Somatic distance -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Religious similarity 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Somatic distance -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Religious similarity 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.35 0.39
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.39) (0.41)
DtS trust 1.78* 1.77* 0.29 0.39 0.77 1.13 1.64* 1.63
(0.99) (1.06) (0.89) (1.02) (0.98) (1.19) (1.00) (1.17)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 13.93 15.21 13.88 14.52 13.15 11.70 15.97 13.97
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 15.05 11.37 14.19 10.10 13.23 8.62 14.73 10.10
Exogeneity
Hansen J -Stat 0.60 0.65 2.50 2.48 1.88 1.59 0.74 0.88
(p-value) (0.44) (0.42) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.39) (0.35)
DtS trust 1.53 1.39 -0.37 -0.65 -0.29 0.05 1.40 1.06
(1.02) (1.16) (1.03) (1.29) (1.29) (1.52) (1.05) (1.33)
Relevance
K-P rk  LM Statistic 11.09 13.19 11.82 13.10 7.83 8.44 12.79 10.71
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Weak Identification
K-P rk  Wald Statistic 20.49 17.22 22.35 16.22 14.61 10.73 23.49 14.29
Observations 463 463 463 463 463 463 463 463
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
Panel D: Second-Stage Estimates using Somatic Distance as Instrument
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
Notes . This table presents the coefficients of estimating the first-stage regression (Panel A), the reduced form equation of the
dependent variable (Panel B), the IV/GMM coefficients of estimating equation (4) when DtS trust is instrumented with both variables
of cultural proximity of country-pairs (Panel C), and the IV estimates when instrumenting DtS trust only with a measure of somatic
distance (Panel D). In each column, we use an alternative indicator of somatic distance as instrument for bilateral trust. In columns (1)
to (4) we use the indicators made available by GSZ, in columns (5) and (6) the indicators elaborated following the instructions given
by Guiso et al. (2008a), and in columns (7) and (8) the measures that take the population density into account. The columns are
labeled with the letters H , C , and S : H stands for height and hair, C for cephalic index, and S for skin. The coefficients of the control
variables (the same as in Table 2) are not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the coefficients are
statistically different from zero at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% level.
Panel A: First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Destination-to-Source Trust
Panel B: Reduced Form Equation of International Migration
Dependent Variable: International Immigration Flows
Panel C: Second-Stage Estimates using somatic distance and religious similarity as instruments
Table 6
Migration Regression: Instrumenting DtS Trust with Alternative Measures of Somatic Distance
Guiso et al. (2009) Replication Pop. Density
DtS trust with the various measures of somatic distance as sole instruments. Consistent
with the reduced-form results in Panel B, the coeﬃcients on instrumented DtS trust
are all statistically insignificant and, like in the trade regressions (Panel D of Table 4)
and analogously to Panel D of Table 5, sometimes even negative.
Overall, the results in Tables 4 to 6 suggest that neither StD nor DtS trust play a role
for international migration flows. In fact, the diﬀerent IV strategies yield remarkably
similar results to the case where trade flows are the dependent variable. In both
settings, the IV strategy proposed by GSZ is validated by the statistical tests but it
yields coeﬃcients that are not robust. Across all estimations, the IV strategy that used
the original measure of somatic distance in GSZ systematically lead to the largest trust
coeﬃcients. As soon as alternative measures of somatic distance are considered, the
coeﬃcients on the trust variable decreases and become negative in some cases.
4 Conclusion
This paper first examined the causal impact of bilateral trust on international trade
patterns. Under bilateral trust we understand the trust that citizens from a potential
destination (importing) country have towards citizens from a potential source (export-
ing) country, which we referred to as "Destination-to-Source (DtS) trust". We analyzed
this relationship in a gravity-type framework which allows us to control for a wide ar-
ray of determinants for trade suggested by the literature. Moreover, employing panel
data allowed us to include time varying national dummies that account for many un-
observed factors. As we still suspect bilateral trust to be endogenous, we followed GSZ
and used two measures of cultural proximity of country-pairs as instrumental variables:
a measure of somatic distance and an indicator of religious similarity. Using exactly
the same measure of somatic distance as GSZ, the estimation results are very similar to
theirs. The OLS coeﬃcients on bilateral trust are insignificant and small in magnitude
but the significant IV coeﬃcients suggest that an increase in DtS trust of one standard
deviation increases aggregated export flows on average by 24 percent.
The picture changes dramatically when instrumenting bilateral trust with alterna-
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tive measures of somatic distance. Interestingly, the exact measure of somatic distance
seems to matter a lot for second-stage results, although first-stage results on the impact
of a change in somatic distance on bilateral trust are similar across the eight measures
we use. In fact, our seven alternative estimates to GSZ typically contradict the re-
sults found in the first place. The trust coeﬃcients not only lose their significance,
but also the point-estimates decrease and even become negative. In contrast to GSZ,
although using similar data and following their basic identification strategy, we find
little evidence that average bilateral trust between country-pairs has a causal eﬀect on
international trade patterns. We conclude that by using just one specific indicator for
somatic distance, GSZ mistakenly rejected the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of higher
bilateral trust on trade.
We next asked whether bilateral trust aﬀects a migrant’s decision to move abroad.
Here, we distinguished two types of bilateral trust: the trust that people living in
a potential source country grant citizens from a potential destination country (StD
trust), and vice versa (DtS trust). To separately analyze the eﬀects of StD trust and
DtS trust we defined two gravity-type specifications and performed the same sensitivity
analysis in the context of international migration as we applied in the context of the
international trade. The patterns are very similar in these two settings. Applying
the IV strategy with the same somatic distance measure as proposed by GSZ, we find
second-stage estimates which suggest that an increase in StD trust or DtS trust of one
standard deviation increases gross immigration flows on average by 66 percent and 56
percent, respectively. However, these economically and statistically significant eﬀects
disappear as soon as we use alternative measures of somatic distance as instrumental
variables for bilateral trust. In other words, like for trade, we do not find any robust
evidence which allows us to conclude that bilateral trust aﬀects international migration
flows.
Overall, this study highlights the fragility of IV estimations of the eﬀect of bilateral
trust on international trade and international migration. More importantly, we find
that already small changes in the construction of the measures of somatic distance used
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for instrumentation of trust completely overturn the results. This holds true although
all the somatic distance indicators are equally correlated with trust and valid.
More generally, our analysis suggests an important caveat on IV estimations in the
case where there is a large degree of freedom in constructing an instrument. Neither
statistical tests nor the theoretical plausibility of a potential instrument are suﬃcient
to draw robust conclusions on causal eﬀects. A thorough sensitivity analysis with
alternative and equally valid instruments is indispensable.
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